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**Top Secret** *(55)*



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DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE


## MEMORANDUM

### *The Situation in Vietnam*

ARMY and DOS review(s) completed.

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Information as of 1600  
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### HIGHLIGHTS

Heavy fighting between US and Communist forces was reported on 4 November, particularly in Tay Ninh Province. US Embassy officials in Saigon report their concern that General Thang may become unwilling to continue as minister of revolutionary development as a result of recent criticism from other government leaders.

I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:  
Viet Cong guerrillas shelled a US installation in Tay Ninh Province (Para. 1). Heavy fighting has been reported between US Army forces and Communist units northeast of Tay Ninh city (Para. 2). Large stores of Communist rice have been seized (Para. 3). South Vietnamese civilian irregulars reported heavy contact with the enemy (Para. 4). A battalion-sized Viet Cong force attacked a South Vietnamese outpost southeast of Tay Ninh city (Para. 5). Weekly review of South Vietnam battle statistics (Para. 6).

II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:  
Recent high-level promotions in the Vietnamese military hierarchy have generally involved officers close to Premier Ky (Para. 1). General Nguyen Duc Thang has recently exhibited increasing discouragement as minister of revolutionary development (Para. 2). Attitudes of members in the Peoples Bloc, the largest such group in the Constituent Assembly (Paras. 3-4). "National Reconciliation"--an expansion and emphasis of the Viet Cong defector program--has been postponed until early next month (Para. 5).

III. North Vietnamese Military Developments:  
North Vietnamese units operating in the Quang Tri - DMZ area reportedly have moved back into the Demilitarized Zone, probably in a tactical move prior to

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further operations (Paras. 1-3).

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IV. Other Communist Military Developments:  
There is nothing of significance to report.

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V. Communist Political Developments: The joint Cuban-DRV communiqué restated Hanoi's determination that the war can only be ended on its terms (Para. 1). DRV representative in Paris comments on negotiation terms and on Hanoi's view of the US political situation (Paras. 2-4).

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ANNEX:


South Vietnam Battle Statistics

1963 through 22-29 October 1966:

- Weapons and Personnel Losses
- Viet Cong Attacks and Incidents

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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. At least four separate actions took place on 4 November between allied and Communist troops in Tay Ninh Province. A major Communist attack occurred when Viet Cong guerrillas launched two pre-dawn mortar attacks against the base camp of the US 169th Infantry Brigade about three miles west of Tay Ninh city. A total of 111 mortar rounds struck the installation causing damage to three helicopters, many vehicles and generators, the base hospital, and the command post area. Two Americans were killed and 54 were wounded in the two attacks, the first of which lasted for two hours. The base camp of the Philippine Civic Action Group, located near the US installation, was also hit, wounding four soldiers. American forces retaliated with mortar fire as flareships illuminated the area. The reaction force was limited, however, because a hit on a power cable cut electrical power for its counter-mortar radar. There were no reports of enemy casualties.

2. Heavy fighting was reported later on 4 November in an area about 15 miles northeast of Tay Ninh city by elements of the US Army search-and-destroy Operation ATTLEBORO. Nearly 100 enemy troops attempted on two occasions to break through a ring of American troops which have surrounded a complex of about 35 fortified bunkers. Initial casualty reports show 15 Americans killed and 10 wounded.

3. This four-battalion operation has been sweeping northwestern Tay Ninh Province since 14 October and is estimated to have seized enough Communist rice stores in the dense jungles of War Zone "C" to feed a Communist division for an entire year. Long a Communist stronghold, War Zone "C" is located in the northern part of Tay Ninh Province along the Cambodian border. The headquarters of the Viet Cong in South Vietnam is believed to be in this area.

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4. A South Vietnamese Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) force also reported heavy contact with an enemy force of undetermined size in an area about seven miles north of the American engagement on 4 November. Preliminary results show two CIDG troops killed and a body count of 15 Viet Cong.

5. Also in Tay Ninh Province, an estimated battalion-size Communist force attacked a South Vietnamese outpost about 20 miles southeast of Tay Ninh city early on 4 November. Allied flare-ships, armed helicopters, artillery fire, and tactical air strikes supported the beleaguered outpost. At the end of a four-hour battle, 50 Viet Cong had been killed and five captured. The South Vietnamese seized the following from the enemy: two machine guns, several flame throwers, one 57-mm. recoilless rifle, three rocket launchers, and 14 individual weapons. South Vietnamese casualties include 13 killed (2 civilians) and 18 wounded.

#### Weekly Review of South Vietnam Battle Statistics

6. The week of 23-29 October compared with the week of 16-22 October:

##### I. Viet Cong Incidents

<u>Time Period</u>	<u>At-tacks</u>	<u>Regimental size</u>	<u>Battalion size</u>
16-22 Oct	51	0	2
23-29 Oct	12	0	0

<u>Time Period</u>	<u>Company size</u>	<u>Harassment</u>	<u>Terrorism</u>
16-22 Oct	2	398	29
23-29 Oct	6	351	46

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<u>Time Period</u>	<u>Sabo- tage</u>	<u>Propa- ganda</u>	<u>Anti- Aircraft</u>	<u>Total Incidents</u>
16-22 Oct	34	10	193	715
23-29 Oct	23	32	225	689

II. Casualties

	<u>VC/NVA</u>		<u>GVN</u>	
	<u>16-22 Oct</u>	<u>23-29 Oct</u>	<u>16-22 Oct</u>	<u>23-29 Oct</u>
Killed	1,229	1,296	339	174
Wounded	-----	-----	623	451
Missing/ Captured	<u>606</u>	<u>191</u>	<u>89</u>	<u>18</u>
TOTALS	1,835	1,487	1,051	643

	<u>US</u>		<u>FREE WORLD</u>	
	<u>16-22 Oct</u>	<u>23-29 Oct</u>	<u>16-22 Oct</u>	<u>23-29 Oct</u>
Killed	62	66	11	11
Wounded	394	492	42	24
Missing/ Captured	<u>15</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTALS	471	558	53	35

III. Weapons Captured

	<u>VC/NVA</u>		<u>GVN</u>	
	<u>16-22 Oct</u>	<u>23-29 Oct</u>	<u>16-22 Oct</u>	<u>23-29 Oct</u>
Individual	608	Not	331	113
Crew-Served	<u>80</u>	Reported	<u>3</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTALS	688		334	113

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## II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. According to a South Vietnamese press report, high-ranking Vietnamese officers promoted on National Day (1 November) included II Corps commander General Vinh Loc, III Corps commander General Le Nguyen Khang, and air force deputy commander Colonel Tran Van Minh. Loc and Khang were promoted to lieutenant general, and Minh to brigadier general. Generals Khang and Minh are known to be close supporters of Premier Ky. The promotion of Loc suggests that any estrangement which had previously been rumored between Loc and Ky no longer exists. Other significant promotions in the past few months include Nguyen Ngoc Loan, Ky's former air force deputy and now police director and military security chief, and airborne brigade commander Du Quoc Dong, who commanded the clearing operation directed against the "struggle forces" in Da Nang in mid-May.

2. US Embassy officials have reported concern that General Nguyen Duc Thang might become unwilling to continue as minister of revolutionary development. On several recent occasions, Thang has stated that the military leaders, including Premier Ky and Chief of State Thieu, have been criticizing civilian efforts in revolutionary development. Thang claims that such criticism by Vietnamese leaders has become "fashionable" in the wake of Secretary McNamara's recent remarks on revolutionary development. It is equally possible, however, that criticism of Thang stems from jealousy among other Vietnamese leaders because US officials have been consistent in their strong praise of Thang's personal efforts. In addition, General Thang admitted to a US official as early as last spring that there was friction between him and Premier Ky, and that Ky had belittled him on several occasions.

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Constituent Assembly Trends

3. Four members of the Peoples Bloc, which is composed of northerners, some Catholics, and Dai Viet Party members from central Vietnam, recently expressed their attitudes on constitutional issues and other assembly matters to US Embassy officers. Generally, the four appear to be thinking in terms of a strong presidential system with broad emergency powers. Other constitutional provisions, however, have not yet been jointly agreed upon.

4. Regarding other blocs in the assembly, the Peoples Bloc members believe that the aims of the Catholic-controlled Democratic Bloc are compatible with their own, and they think that a number of deputies from this bloc as well as some independents may join the Peoples Bloc soon, giving it an absolute majority in the assembly. They regard the Alliance Bloc--primarily a moderate southern group--as potentially cooperative, but are strongly opposed to the disruptive tactics used by members of the Movement for the Renaissance of the South, a small group of militant regionalists. The US Embassy has commented that several members of the Peoples Bloc, which emerged as a significant force during the recent assembly elections, have close relations with Premier Ky, and that the bloc as a whole will probably display a cooperative attitude in its dealings with the government.

"National Reconciliation" Postponed

5. According to General Tri, the minister of information and Chieu Hoi, the publication of the proclamation on "National Reconciliation"--expansion and increased emphasis on the Viet Cong defector program--has been postponed until early next month. Thus far, Premier Ky and Chief of State Thieu have presented the program to the Armed Forces Council and have also privately urged the cooperation of other delegations which they contacted on National Day. Current government planning, according to Tri, calls for a concentrated effort for the program between early December and March.

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### III. NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

1. MACV has reported that there has been no significant contact with enemy forces directly below the central and eastern portions of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) for the past three weeks. It is possible that, except for reconnaissance elements, the units of the 324th and 341st divisions, which were in this area, have moved back into and north of the DMZ. MACV also reports having lost contact with a number of enemy battalions in the western DMZ area.

2. The move of Communist forces back into North Vietnam is likely to be a temporary tactic to enable these forces to regroup for future operations. Elements of the 324th Division retreated into the DRV after encountering a series of sharp setbacks during the course of US Operation HASTINGS in July. This type of activity is reminiscent of that used by the Communists in the central highlands adjacent to Cambodia. Communist units there have repeatedly moved back and forth across the Cambodian border, fighting at times and places of their own choosing while attempting to keep their main force units intact.

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IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

There is nothing of significance to report.

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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

1. The joint communiqué signed on 1 November at the conclusion of Cuban President Dorticos' visit to Hanoi reflects the closeness in Havana-Hanoi relations that was apparent from Vietnamese treatment of the Cuban delegation throughout its three-day visit. The Cubans expressed strong support in the communiqué for all of Hanoi's important positions. The communiqué included a strong rebuff to the recent peace proposals offered at the Manila Conference and a reiteration of Hanoi's intransigent position that it is unwilling to negotiate on any terms other than its own four points. The communiqué stressed the importance of unity of action throughout the Communist world in opposing US "imperialism" and repeated Cuba's pledge to send volunteers to Vietnam whenever they are requested.

North Vietnam on Negotiations

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[REDACTED] Huynh Tieng, first secretary of the North Vietnamese delegation in Paris, provided one of the clearest interpretations of the remarks on negotiations made by the head of his delegation, Mai Van Bo, at the time of the first US bombing pause in mid-May 1965. Tieng stated that Bo's remarks had been confined to restating the DRV's standard four points on negotiations, including an explanation that the demand for a US troop withdrawal raised in point one meant a "commitment to withdraw" and did not require actual US withdrawal for negotiations. Tieng's remarks on this point are consistent with other interpretations of Bo's remarks and provide a good explanation of what the latter meant when he told the French that the four points were not to be considered "prior conditions" but rather "working principles" for negotiations.

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3. Neither Tieng nor any other Vietnamese spokesman has, however, spelled out what specifically is meant by a "commitment to withdraw." The North Vietnamese have, in fact, carefully avoided being pinned down on this point and on several others stemming from their four points in a determined effort to preserve a flexible position on the entire issue of negotiations.

4. During the discussion, Tieng also provided interesting insight into the importance the Vietnamese Communists attach to American public opinion concerning the war. Speaking of signs in the US which he claimed indicated that the American public was becoming increasingly critical of the Johnson administration's policy on the war, Tieng stated that he was convinced that the American public "would come around" to opposing the war. He asserted, however, that this would take some time and would require the Vietnamese Communists to continue their struggle. At the present time he felt that "it was too early" for the war to have a decisive effect on US voters, and that the November elections would "prove nothing."

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



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

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



## Weapons Losses



## Personnel Losses (Excluding Wounded)



US Casualties to Date: Killed 5,613 Wounded 32,295 Captured 78 Missing 348



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